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Abstract 
 
This paper uses firm-level data to investigate the impact of taxes on the international location 
of targets in M&A. In principle, a higher tax rate in the target’s country could make an 
acquisition there more likely, less likely, or have no effect at all. We combine financial and 
ownership data for companies in ORBIS in 2005 with domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
in ZEPHYR between 2006 and 2008. We estimate a random parameters form of mixed logit 
model. We find that the statutory tax rate in the target country has a negative impact on the 
probability of an acquisition in that country, with an average elasticity of around 1. The size 
of the effect differs (i) between acquirers that were multinational or domestic in 2005; (ii) 
between domestic and cross-border acquisitions; and (iii) depending on whether the 
acquirer’s country has a worldwide or territorial tax system.  
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The growth of international cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over the last two 
decades is well documented. UNCTAD (2011) reports that the total value of cross-border 
M&A deals rose from around $21 million in 1991 to £338 million in 2010. But this was no 
steady increase: during that period there were two major waves, peaking at $905 million in 
2000 and just over $1 trillion in 2007. This growth can be seen in the context of total mergers 
and acquisitions, and in the context of total cross-border investment. Erel et al (2011) report 
that the percentage of all mergers and acquisitions accounted for by cross-border deals rose 
from 23% in 1998 to 45% in 2007. And, according to UNCTAD data, the percentage of all 
foreign direct investment that took the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose 
from 14% in 1991 to over 50% by 1999. Following the financial crash, it has since declined 
to 27%, but in several recent years the proportion has been well in excess of 50%.1  
 This paper examines one aspect of the determination of mergers and acquisitions: the 
choice of location of the target company by an acquirer. We analyse the determinants of 
choices made by 2,623 individual acquiring corporations from 47 countries across 19 
possible locations of domestic and cross-border target corporations. We pay particular 
attention to the role of taxation in affecting this location choice. A number of features of this 
paper differentiate it from previous research.  
First, in the case of a multinational company, we combine two different datasets 
(ZEPHYR and ORBIS, described further below) to identify how an acquisition affects the 
geographic spread of the whole company. Most previous studies identify the acquiring 
company as the immediate new owner of the target company.2 By contrast, by combining 
these two datasets we are able to identify the acquirer as the parent company of the 
multinational (as well as to control for characteristics of the parent). Suppose, for example, 
that a British subsidiary of a US parent company acquired a German company. In one sense 
that represents a flow of foreign direct investment from the UK to Germany. However, 
control of the German company effectively passes to the US parent. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that an acquisition of any size would be approved, or more likely be organised, by 
the parent, which could be considered to have expanded into a third country, and which 
would, directly or indirectly, control the activities of the whole group. 
                                               
1  A useful description of the pattern of cross-border M&A activity is provided by Brakman et al (2006).  
2  A common alternative source for mergers and acquisitions is the SDC database, although as noted below, 
several others have been used.  
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Second, in identifying the location of target companies, we pay particular attention to 
heterogeneity in the characteristics of the acquirer. For example, many of the acquiring 
corporations in our dataset do not have foreign subsidiaries prior to the acquisition being 
examined. It seems plausible to suppose that there are fixed costs associated especially with a 
corporation’s first foreign acquisition; in choosing between a domestic and foreign target, this 
would imply that the gross benefits of acquiring a foreign target would need to be greater for 
a wholly domestic corporation than for the parent of a corporation that was already 
multinational. This suggests that, for a first foreign expansion at least, the decision to acquire 
a foreign corporation is more likely to be determined by strategic considerations, and is less 
likely to be influenced by marginal differences in taxation. The possible existence of fixed 
costs also suggests that the size of the corporation may also matter. We explore both of these 
dimensions. 
Third, we pay particular attention to the role of corporate taxation. Of course many 
factors will contribute both to the choice of whether to acquire another corporation, and 
which target to choose. Many factors have been extensively analysed, both in the context of 
domestic deals, and in the context of aggregate cross-border flows, and are briefly reviewed 
in Section I below. The role of taxes on profit is far from straightforward, and may differ 
substantially depending on whether the target is domestic or foreign. For example, even in the 
absence of all other factors, in a domestic context it is possible that a merger could release 
unused taxable losses in the target company to be set against taxable profit in the parent. Such 
a merger would create private value, at the expense of tax revenue for the government. 
However, it is very rare for a government to allow losses to be offset in this way across 
international borders.  
We show below that, in principle, a higher tax rate in a country could raise, reduce, or 
leave unchanged the probability that its corporations are the subject of a cross-border 
acquisition. Suppose that an acquisition may take place because the acquirer is able to 
increase its revenue stream, through improved efficiency, greater knowledge or perhaps 
simply use of a brand name. Taxes on future profit of the existing corporation should already 
be capitalised into its value to existing shareholders. Similarly taxes on any surplus generated 
by the acquisition would be capitalised into the value to the acquirer. In a case in which 
existing shareholders had greater bargaining power in the deal, and captured the entire 
surplus, then tax should have no impact on the probability of the deal going ahead. This is 
because the acquirer is simply making a zero net present value transaction. A higher tax rate 
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would reduce the value of the surplus, but would not change the value to the acquirer. In a 
less extreme case, a higher tax rate would reduce the post-tax surplus to the acquirer, making 
it more likely that the acquirer would seek an alternative. However, it may also be the case 
that the acquisition takes place for strategic reasons, with the acquirer intending to close 
down the activities of the target to reduce competition (see, for example, Neary, 2007). In this 
case, a higher tax rate would reduce the value and hence the price of the target, making it 
more attractive for the acquirer. We discuss these and other possible cases below. 
We also consider other aspects of the tax regime in both the target’s country and 
acquirer’s country. For example, in considering the case in which the acquirer may seek to 
shift production to a lower cost environment, the rate of capital allowance may be a factor. 
This consideration moves the analysis much closer to a conventional treatment of taxation in 
the case of cross-border greenfield investment. The discrete decision as to where to locate a 
new greenfield investment should in principle depend on an effective average tax rate, taking 
into account all relevant aspects of the tax regime (see Devereux and Griffith, 1998). In the 
context of a cross-border acquisition, however, this effect is likely to be secondary, unless the 
acquirer intends to undertake significant new capital expenditure in the target, post-
acquisition. 
We also allow for the possibility that tax would be levied by the acquirer’s country on 
returns ultimately paid back to the parent corporation, especially in the form of dividends. 
This element of the international tax regime was the primary focus of the analysis by 
Huizinga and Voget (2009) which investigated, in the context of cross-border mergers, which 
of the two companies involved in a merger became the new parent company. For example, 
they cite the case of the merger which led to a multinational firm with a parent (Daimler) 
located in Germany and a subsidiary (Chrysler) in the US as resulting to a large extent from 
Germany exempting foreign source dividend income while the US taxed such income (net of 
a foreign tax credit). In the context of our analysis, this consideration would imply that the 
tax rate in the target company’s country would be less important in the case where that rate 
was lower than the rate in the acquirer’s country, and where the acquirer’s country taxed 
worldwide income.  
Fourth, we pay careful attention to the econometric structure of the problem. Unlike 
almost all previous empirical work on the location of M&As, we investigate directly at firm 
level the choices of corporations as to where they acquire a target company, conditional on 
choosing to make an acquisition. We use a form of the mixed logit model, which allows us to 
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avoid making the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives inherent in a 
standard multinomial logit model.3 We allow for randomness in the effects of some of the 
variables. In our central approach, we consider only companies that make a single acquisition 
in the three year period 2005-8. However, as a robustness check we also allow for companies 
to acquire companies in more than one location in the period considered. 
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on 
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. However, the size of the effect 
differs according to the characteristics of the acquirer and whether the acquisition is domestic 
or cross-border. More specifically, we find no effect of taxation on the choice for domestic 
companies as to whether to make their first cross-border acquisition. However, tax does 
affect the choice between cross-border locations. By contrast, multinational companies are 
sensitive to taxes for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, although they are less 
sensitive to differences in taxation between cross-border acquisitions than are domestic 
companies. There is some evidence that these effects are particularly strong for large 
companies.  
We find evidence that the effect of the tax rate in the country of the target company 
plays a much less significant role or no role at all, when that tax rate is below that of the 
acquirer’s country, and where the latter operates a worldwide, rather than territorial, tax 
system. This is consistent with the acquirer taking into account home country taxation on 
profits earned in the target. This element of the tax system has also been found to be 
important in the location of parent companies (see Huizinga and Voget, 2009, and Voget, 
2011), and in the location of new subsidiaries (Barrios et al, 2008).  
Section I presents a brief review of the relevant literature on which we draw. This 
literature informs the approach in Section II which explores the role of taxes in two simple 
frameworks, drawing on efficiency and strategic considerations. We develop a number of 
hypotheses concerning the role of tax in different situations. In the remainder of the paper, we 
confront these hypotheses with firm-level data on cross-border acquisitions taking place 
between 2005 and 2008 from the ZEPHYR database. We combine these data with 
information on corporate structures and financial positions in 2005, from the ORBIS 
database. Both datasets are commercially provided by Bureau van Dijk. In Section III, we set 
                                               
3  Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a consequence of assuming independent errors across different 
choices for each company. This implies that the ratio of two choice probabilities is independent of the other 
choices/alternatives in the choice set. 
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out our empirical methodology and describe the data in more detail. In Section IV we present 
our results. We conclude in Section V. 
I. Related Literature 
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding the 
pattern of cross-border M&A activity, on which we draw in this paper. The finance and 
industrial organization literatures have explored the motives for M&As, and to a lesser extent 
have applied similar analysis to cross-border M&As. The finance and international 
economics literatures have explored the role of cross-border investment flows, though again 
only to a lesser extent has the analysis been applied specifically to cross-border M&As. In the 
space available here we focus primarily on empirical studies that are close to ours.   
A number of papers focus on various aspects of the valuation of the target and 
acquirer for cross border M&As. For example, Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2011) investigate 
differences in valuation which could arise from imperfect integration of capital markets so 
that a high-valued acquirer may purchase a low-valued target following movements in 
exchange rates or stock market valuations in local currency. Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009) 
similarly argue that mispricing of securities could generate arbitrage through cross-border 
M&As, particularly when the mispricing is expected to revert the following year4 and  
particularly in the presence of capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of 
cross-country arbitrage. This could arise due to overpricing of the acquirer (the “cheap 
financial capital” hypothesis, similar to the model of Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or 
underpricing of the target (the “cheap assets” hypothesis, similar to the model of Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992). Both papers find support for these hypotheses using aggregate flows between 
bilateral pairs of countries, Erel et al using the total number of M&A deals and Baker et al 
using aggregate flows of FDI.  
Permanent differences in valuation may arise from differences in investor protection 
across countries. Erel et al (2011) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) both find support for the view 
that relatively weak investor protection in a country increases the probability of a cross-
border acquisition.5 Rossi and Volpin examine this in the context of an empirical model 
                                               
4  Though permanent differences could also generate more cross-border M&A (see Froot and Stein, 1991).  
5  Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that merger premia for cross-border mergers relative to domestic mergers 
increase with investor protection and accounting standards in the acquirer’s country. Ellis et al (2011) also 
find that acquirers from countries with better governance gain more from acquisitions and that their gains are 
higher when their targets are from countries with worse governance. 
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which analyses the proportion of targets acquired in a country where the acquirer is from a 
different country. A similar empirical approach is taken by Ferriera, Massimo and Matos 
(2009), in identifying whether foreign portfolio ownership of target companies makes them 
more or less likely to be acquired in a cross border acquisition. A substitution hypothesis 
implies it will be less likely, since shareholders can use international portfolio investment to 
diversify around the world, and therefore have less need of FDI by domestic multinationals. 
However, they instead find support for a facilitation hypothesis that implies that large 
institutional shareholders are more likely to look favourably on bids from foreign 
multinationals, compared to purely domestic shareholders.6 Ferriera et al also explore this at 
the firm level, examining whether a given target is acquired by a domestic or foreign 
acquirer.  
 Beyond specific issues of valuation, there have been many theoretical contributions 
of the role of M&As in the development of multinational companies. 7  Very broadly, these 
tend to distinguish two motives: an efficiency motive where gains arise through economies of 
scale, internal technology transfer or coordination of decision making, and a strategic motive, 
as firms seek to reduce competition in the market. The extent of these motives may differ 
between firms, and across countries. For example, the strategic motive depends on the degree 
to which the markets in the two countries are integrated. And clearly greenfield investment 
has very different strategic implications from acquisition. Host country governments also 
sometimes view inbound investment in the form of an acquisition rather differently from 
inbound greenfield investment, on the grounds that it primarily constitutes a change of 
ownership rather than an addition to the country’s capital stock.8 
 A small number of studies have examined macroeconomic factors in the 
determination of cross-border M&As.9 Di Giovanni (2005) and Coeurdacier, De Santis and 
Aviat (2009) examine the determinants of aggregate M&A flows between bilateral pairs of 
countries, using data from 1990-1999 and 1985-2004, respectively. Di Giovanni finds that the 
                                               
6  Desai and Dharmapala (2009) investigate the tradeoff in international diversification between foreign direct 
investment and foreign portfolio investment; from the perspective of the US, FDI faces a tax disadvantage 
but has an advantage where the target country has weak investor protection.  
7  See, for example, Ferrett (2005), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Neary (2007, 2009), Norbäck and Persson 
(2007).  
8 That raises the general question of the optimal tax treatment of inbound and outbound M&A activity, which 
is addressed by Becker and Fuest (2010) and Norbäck, Persson and Vlachos (20009). These papers aim to 
identify whether the classical optimal tax results in the literature also apply to cross-border investment in the 
form of M&As. 
9  Seth et al (2002) investigate the sources of gains and losses on cross border M&As, but do not examine the 
locations.  
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size of domestic financial markets has a strong positive association with domestic firms 
investing abroad, while Coeurdacier et al find significant effects of membership of the EMU 
and the EU. Both papers find a significantly negative impact of corporate taxation in the 
country of the acquired company. Bertrand, Mucchielli and Zitouna (2007) follow a more 
similar approach to that used in this paper, estimating a conditional logit model to determine 
the location of the target for a given acquirer. Using data on 400 European acquisitions, they 
find that market size, labour costs, market access and financial openness all play a role in 
determining the location of the target. 
 There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of taxation in 
FDI flows, surveyed by, for example, Devereux and Maffini (2007) and De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2008). A small part of the empirical work distinguishes the extensive and intensive 
margins, reflecting the literature on multinational companies (see, for example, Markusen, 
2002). The extensive margin refers to various discrete choices, for example, whether to locate 
production abroad, and if so, where to locate it. The intensive margin is the decision as to 
how much to invest, conditional on deciding to invest in a given form in a given country. As 
emphasised by Devereux and Griffith (1998), the role played by tax differs between these 
two margins: discrete choices are generally influenced by an effective average tax rate, while 
the continuous investment decision depends on the effective marginal tax rate.  
 A sparse literature has investigated the role of tax on the extensive margin of location. 
Using a nested logit framework, Devereux and Griffith (1998) consider the determinants of a 
decision by a US company to choose to locate in one of France, Germany and the UK. It 
identifies whether the parent owns a subsidiary in each of the other countries at a specific 
moment in time; however, it does not observe the location decision itself, which may have 
been some time in the past. Three other papers, Büttner and Ruf (2007), Barrios et al (2008) 
and Hebous, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2011) also use firm level data to investigate discrete 
location choices of multinational companies. All, however, use a logit model that implies that 
the choice of a parent firm to invest in another country j is independent of whether it invests 
in a third country k. In this sense, these papers do not therefore consider the choice between 
countries. The first three of these papers do not specifically consider M&A location 
decisions. Devereux and Griffith consider whether the parent company has a firm in location 
i at a given moment in time. Büttner and Ruf identify cases where a German parent company 
has subsidiary in country i in period t, but not period t-1, which could be the result of an 
acquisition or greenfield investment. Barrios et al effectively identify the birth of new 
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companies owned by a foreign parent, which is most easily interpreted as greenfield 
investment. Nevertheless, all three papers find that taxes in the host country play a significant 
role in location decisions. Barrios et al also investigate the role of taxes in the parent country, 
and also find these to be significant. The fourth paper, Hebous et al, uses data on German 
parents which identify whether location decisions result from greenfield investment or an 
acquisition, and estimates the impact of taxation in each case, finding that greenfield 
investment responds more strongly to higher taxation than do acquisitions.  
II. Alternative hypotheses of the role of tax in the location of targets 
Mergers and acquisitions occur when combining two corporations increases private value, as 
perceived by the decision makers. As noted above, there are at least three sets of reasons why 
value may increase, relating to differences in valuation, improvements in efficiency and 
restriction of competition. We do not specifically investigate these factors here. Instead we 
attempt to identify the role of taxation in the choice of location of the target company, 
conditional on the plans for the new firm after the acquisition has taken place, and in the light 
of alternative factors which may generate the acquisition in the absence of tax considerations. 
We do not set out to provide a general framework or develop general equilibrium conditions. 
Rather we have the more modest aim of identifying the interaction of taxes and the key 
features of acquisitions and mergers. We consider separately the two motives of efficiency 
improvement and strategic behaviour, although recognizing that these may not be 
independent of each other. In this context, differences in valuation usually have similar 
effects to changes in efficiency.  
II.1. Efficiency motive  
We begin with a basic model emphasizing efficiency considerations. We will analyse this 
primarily in the context of companies which are seeking either to expand their activities, or to 
reduce their costs. Prior to the acquisition, the acquiring companies may be purely domestic, 
or they may already be active in more than one country.10 In the conceptual framework, we 
assume that the company seeks to acquire another company, either in the same country 
(country i) or abroad (the “host” or “foreign” country, j).  In the empirical section we 
generalise this to consider a number of possible foreign locations: this does not add any 
                                               
10 We do not explore the precise pattern of ownership. For example, the parent company may own a subsidiary 
in country, B, which in turn owns a further subsidiary in C. We do not distinguish this case from that in 
which the parent company directly owns both companies.  
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issues of principle, other than that the size of the response to differences in tax rates may vary 
between the choices available to the acquirer. In the simple analysis set out here, we assume 
that the acquiring company makes either one acquisition or no acquisition at all.11 In 
robustness checks in the empirical work, we allow a company to undertake more than one 
acquisition. The central question posed is whether, and how, the tax system can affect the 
choice of where to acquire a target. We nevertheless identify a rich range of channels by 
which taxes can affect the acquisition decision, and in particular in which country the 
acquirer is likely to purchase the target company.  
 First consider the value of a potential target company to its existing owners. Suppose 
that the company expects to earn a stream of income with a present value of Y , and to incur 
costs with a present value of C . In the absence of taxes, the value of the company to existing 
owners is therefore simply CYV −=ˆ , where the hat indicates the value before taxes.  
 Now suppose that corporation tax is levied on taxable profit at rateτ . Relief is given 
for costs. However, this relief may have a present value which is less than the present value 
of the stream of costs itself. For example, capital expenditure may not be immediately 
deductible against tax; as a result the present value of the tax deduction will be less thanC . 
Define the proportion of the present value of costs that represent a deduction as α , so that 
the present value of the tax liability is  ( )CYT ατ −= , and the value of the company after tax 
is  
 ( )CYV βτ −−= )1(         (1) 
where )1/()1( τατβ −−= is a measure of the generosity of the definition of the tax base.12 
We do not consider other taxes in this analysis. Expression (1) could apply to a potential 
target in either country, which we denote below with a subscript i or j. Note that all of the 
elements in (1) may vary between the two countries.  
 Now consider the value to the acquiring company. We assume that the acquisition 
will not take place unless the acquiring company values the target company more highly than 
the existing shareholders. That is, some surplus must be generated from the acquisition – 
which must be divided between the acquiring company and the existing owners of the target 
                                               
11  Implicitly, then, either the costs of making more than one acquisition are too high, or the benefits in terms of 
higher income are too low. 
12  For example, for a cash flow tax, levied only on economic rent, then 1== βα . 
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company. Further, we assume that in choosing between alternative targets, the acquiring 
company chooses the target that generates the highest surplus to the acquiring company.  
 Before identifying the source of this surplus, an important issue to consider is how the 
surplus is distributed between the two parties. At the two extremes, the whole surplus will be 
captured by one of the parties. The maximum price that the acquirer is willing to pay is his 
own valuation of the target. In this case, the acquirer does not share in the surplus at all. This 
may happen, for example, if there are many bidding companies, but only one possible target. 
In this case, the target shareholders would be able to hold out for the entire surplus.13 In this 
case, the tax system should have no impact on whether the acquisition goes ahead since the 
acquirer’s valuation is post-tax – a higher tax rate would lower his valuation, and hence also 
lower the price paid. The acquirer would be indifferent between paying higher tax, but a 
lower acquisition price, and lower tax but a higher acquisition price; in either case the surplus 
to the acquirer would remain at zero. This leads to: 
Proposition 1: If the target firm captures the entire surplus generated by the acquisition, then 
tax has no effect on the acquisition decision.  
 In what follows, we assume instead that the acquirer captures at least some fraction of 
the surplus. More specifically, we assume that the fraction captured by the acquirer does not 
depend on the location of the target. In comparing targets located in different countries, the 
proportion of the surplus captured by the acquirer then becomes irrelevant. Given this, we 
make the simplifying assumption that the acquirer captures the whole of the surplus. 
 In this simple framework, there are four ways in which the acquirer could raise the 
value of the target company, and thereby create a surplus: (a) increase income,Y ; (b) reduce 
costs,C ; or (c) reduce tax liabilities, by reducing the relevant tax rate by shifting profit 
between locations; or (d) undertake additional investment in the target company which 
creates a surplus. Consider each of these in turn.  
(a) First, suppose for example that the acquiring and target companies are in a horizontal 
relationship: that is, they each produce a similar good which is sold on the world market. But 
the acquiring company may be larger and have a recognized brand name, which allows it to 
charge a higher price for its output. By acquiring the target company, the acquirer can 
increase the value of the target by re-labelling the product with the acquirer’s brand, thereby 
increasing the income stream, .Y  Denote the change in the value of the target’s income 
                                               
13  This is assumed by Norbäck, et al (2009), for example.  
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stream as a result of the acquisition to be Y∆ . Then the post-tax surplus generated from the 
acquisition is 
Home:  (1 )i i iS Yτ= − ∆       (2a) 
Foreign:  *(1 )j j jS Yτ= − ∆       (2b) 
where *jτ  is defined below. It is clear from these expressions that the surplus depends only on 
Y∆  and the statutory tax rate. Assuming that the acquirer chooses the target which would 
generate the highest post-tax surplus, then: 
Proposition 2:  If the acquirer could increase the value of the income stream in the target, 
then ceteris paribus it would be more likely to acquire a target company in the country with 
the lower statutory tax rate.  
 To test this proposition empirically it is clearly necessary to control for any 
differences in the pre-tax surplus that might be systematically expected across countries. 
There are many possible factors that could create differences in the pre-tax surplus across 
countries, some of which have been discussed above; they include, for example, the financial 
depth in the country of the target relative to the country of the acquirer, the extent of foreign 
portfolio ownership of the target, differences in valuations between the two countries, the size 
of the available market in the country of the target, the general economic prospects in that 
country,  and the availability of cheap inputs. We discuss below the control variables used in 
the empirical work. These would have a direct effect on the size of the pre-tax surplus for 
each target, which may well outweigh the effects of taxation. Note also, though, that the 
effect of an increase in the tax rate on the post-tax surplus depends on the size of the pre-tax 
surplus.  
 Comment is also required about the tax rate applied to the surplus in the foreign 
country, denoted here *jτ  rather than simply jτ . The asterisk denotes that the term includes 
not only tax due in the foreign country on profits made there, but also potentially a 
withholding tax levied on the payment of a dividend or other return to the home country 
parent, and further tax levied in the home country on receipt of the return. In particular, 
ignoring deferral, then if the home country uses a credit system, foreign dividends will be 
taxed at rate iτ  with a credit for foreign taxes paid. Broadly in this case, if j iτ τ< , then 
additional tax will be charged by the home country, so that, effectively *j iτ τ= .  In practice 
12 
 
the home country tax can be deferred by not repatriating the profit made abroad. In general 
though, where the home country operates a credit system, there may be an asymmetric effect 
of the foreign tax rate. Where j iτ τ<   and the home country operates a system of worldwide 
taxation with credit, then there may be little effect of the foreign tax rate, jτ , on the post-tax 
surplus (depending on whether all profits are repatriated). For j iτ τ≥ , the predictions of 
proposition 2 hold.  
(b) Second, suppose that the acquiring company is low cost, that the target is initially high 
cost, and that post-acquisition the acquiring company is able to reduce the costs in the target 
from high cost, say HC , to low cost, say LC . This may occur through the use of better 
technology, organization, or management skills. Again, suppose this holds whether the target 
is a domestic or foreign company.  
 In this case, the surplus generated from the acquisition is 
home:    (1 )( )i i i H LS C Cα τ= − −      (3a) 
foreign:  *(1 )( )j j j H LS C Cα τ= − −       (3b) 
In this case, the impact of tax depends on the value of the tax allowances, measured by i iα τ   
and *j jα τ . Note that the higher the value of allowances, the smaller the gain from reducing 
costs. This implies that:  
Proposition 3:  If the acquirer can reduce costs in the target, then it will be more likely to 
acquire a target company in the country with a low value of tax allowances. A lower value of 
allowances could be generated by less generous allowances, or by a lower statutory tax rate.  
 Proposition 3 abstracts from any difference in the reduction in cost across countries. A 
related possibility is that the acquiring company has high costs (say HC ) because it is located 
in a high-cost economy. Such a company may seek to reduce costs (say to LC ) by relocating 
its production, or part of its production, to a low-cost economy. In this case, the surplus from 
moving production abroad would be  
foreign:  *(1 ) (1 )j i i H j j LS C Cα τ α τ= − − −     (3c) 
Here the value of the tax allowances in the foreign country has a positive effect on the value 
of the surplus since additional expenditure takes place there. This implies:  
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Proposition 4:  If the acquirer intends to shift production from a high-cost home country to a 
lower-cost foreign country, then the acquirer will be more likely to choose a foreign country 
with a higher value of tax allowances.  A higher value of allowances could be generated by 
more generous allowances, or by a higher statutory tax rate.  
 The stark difference between Propositions 3 and 4 reflects a difference in where the 
cost saving is assumed to take place. In Proposition 3, it takes place in the country of the 
target, and the value of the saving is reduced by the tax allowance. In proposition 4, it takes 
place in the home country. The saving is then reduced by the value of the foregone tax 
allowance in the home country, at the cost of higher expenditure in the foreign country.  
(c) Another possibility is that the acquirer can affect the tax liability itself and can generate 
private surplus at the expense of tax authorities. There are at least two ways in which this 
could happen. To explore these, suppose that the acquirer makes no other changes to the 
target company.  
 The first possibility is that either the target company or the acquiring company is in a 
country with a high tax rate, while the other is in a country with a low tax rate. Now suppose 
that the relationship between the two companies is a vertical relationship: that is, the 
company in one country produces a good or service which it sells to the other. To make this 
more concrete, suppose that the target company supplies a good to its new parent. This good 
is unique, and hence difficult to value for tax purposes. This gives the new combined 
company the opportunity to mis-price the transaction to shift income from the high-tax 
country to the low-tax country. Another possibility for shifting profit is simply to lend from 
the low tax country to the high tax country, gaining a tax relief in the high-tax country on the 
interest payment at the expense of a (lower) tax charge in the low-tax country. In any case, 
suppose that the amount of income shifted is X . Then the surplus generated by the newly-
acquired opportunity to shift profit is  
foreign:  *( ) 0j i jS Xτ τ= − ≥       (4) 
 Clearly this opportunity does not exist in the case of a purely domestic acquisition, 
since this does not create the opportunity to shift profits between countries.14 More generally, 
though, the size of the surplus depends both on the extent to which profit-shifting becomes 
possible (measured by X ), and by the difference in statutory tax rates. Summarising: 
                                               
14 Other opportunities may arise instead, such as combining profits in one company with losses in another.  
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Proposition 5:  If a cross-border acquisition introduces an opportunity to shift profits 
between countries, then the surplus is higher the greater the difference in statutory tax rates 
between the two countries.  
 Note that the opportunities to shift profits between jurisdictions are likely to depend 
on the number of jurisdictions in which the company already operates, and the skills which it 
has already acquired in doing so. An acquirer that was purely domestic prior to the 
acquisition has only two countries between which it can shift profit. A large multinational has 
rather more options to shift profits around foreign countries. Thus, while expression (4) 
points to the comparison of the home country tax rate with a single foreign country tax rate, 
the more general case considered in the empirical work below also implies comparison 
between the tax rates in other jurisdictions in which the company has a presence.  
 The possibility of shifting profit out of a high-tax country may reduce the negative 
impact of the high tax rate on the probability of acquiring a target there. By contrast, the 
possibility of shifting profit into a low-tax country would reinforce the positive impact of the 
low tax rate on the probability of acquiring a target there. This suggests a possible 
asymmetric response to the foreign country tax rate, depending on whether or not it is an 
attractive location in which to shift profit, which depends in turn on the other tax rates faced 
by the acquirer in its worldwide operations.  
(d) A final possibility which we consider under the general heading of efficiency is that 
acquirer seeks a bigger operation than the target currently undertakes. That is, the acquirer 
intends to purchase the target and then to invest further to expand operations. The surplus 
from the acquisition is generated by the additional investment, which we assume could not be 
undertaken by the current owners. Given that we focus only on acquisitions, we also assume 
that this is a cheaper option for the acquiring company than undertaking a completely new 
greenfield investment.  
The role of tax in affecting the surplus in this case is very similar to the role of tax in a 
greenfield investment: new investment receives an allowance that can be set against the 
existing taxable profit of the target company, and the higher future income is subject to tax. 
In comparing the discrete choice of in which country to undertake such an operation, the 
relevant measure of taxation is the effective average tax rate (EATR), denoted T below (see 
Devereux and Griffith, 1998, 2003). This measure is in effect simply a non-linear 
combination of the statutory rate and the value of allowances.  
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 Denoting W as the pre-tax net present value of the surplus generated by additional 
investment, the post-tax surplus is  
Home:  (1 )i i iS T W= −        (5a) 
Foreign:  *(1 )j j jS T W= −       (5b) 
Clearly a lower EATR increases the post-tax surplus, which implies: 
Proposition 6:  If a cross-border acquisition is based on the intention to expand the activities 
of the target, then the acquirer will be more likely to acquire a target company in the country 
with the lower effective average tax rate (EATR).  
II.2. Strategic motive 
So far we have explored only efficiency aspects of acquisitions, through generating higher 
income, lower costs, or simply lower tax liabilities. However, in an industry with a relatively 
small number of companies, there is clearly the possibility of a strategic motive. One simple 
approach to analyzing strategic behaviour – see for example, Neary (2007) – is to assume 
constant unit costs for each firm. This implies that a low cost firm does not need to acquire a 
target as part of its expansion, since there is no cost constraint on the amount of output it can 
produce, but only a constraint imposed by the demand side of the market. As a result, in this 
type of model, a low cost firm will acquire a higher cost firm only with the intention of 
closing it down. In a market where there are barriers to entry, this would reduce industry 
output, thereby allowing a rise in the output price and an increase in the per unit profitability 
of the remaining firms including the acquirer.  
 Although we do not explicitly present the model here, the implications for taxation are 
intuitive, and are:  
Proposition 7:  In the case of a strategic acquisition of a high cost target firm, which is 
closed down after acquisition, then (a) the statutory tax rate applied to the target company 
has a positive impact on the probability that the target is acquired, and (b) the statutory tax 
rate applied to the acquirer has a negative impact on the probability of the acquisition 
proceeding. 
That is, since the target is acquired with the intention of closing it, then the lower price that 
the acquirer must pay, the higher the surplus. Because taxation is capitalised into the value of 
16 
 
the target, a higher tax rate reduces its value, and hence raises the surplus. A second effect 
applies to the acquirer. Since the output price and revenue rise, then the surplus also depends 
negatively on the tax rate that the acquirer must pay on the additional revenue.  
II.3. A Summary of Propositions 
We have set out 7 propositions reflecting the effects of taxation in the country of the potential 
target company and in the country of the potential acquirer, on the probability that the target 
is acquired by the acquirer. These are summarised in the following table.  
 
 Reason for surplus to 
acquirer 
Effect on probability of acquiring a target in given 
country of that country’s: 
  Statutory tax rate Value of allowances 
1 Surplus captured by 
shareholders of target 
company 
No effect No effect 
2 Raise value of income in 
target 
<0 
Effect weaker when  
(i) home country has credit 
system and (ii) j iτ τ<  
No effect 
3 Reduce costs in target Negative indirect effect <0 
4 Shift production to low-
cost target  
Positive indirect effect >0 
5 Increased opportunity for 
shifting income to low-
tax countries  
<0 
Profit shifting weakens 
effect of Proposition 2 for 
high jτ and reinforces it for 
low jτ  
No direct effect 
6 Additional investment 
post-acquisition 
EATR has negative effect on probability 
7 Strategic motive >0 No direct effect 
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III. Empirical Approach 
a. Methodology 
An, acquiring company indexed by i in our model, is assumed to acquire a target in a country 
j which provides the largest expected surplus over all countries, where the latent surplus 
associated with the target in country j is given by 
 'ij j i j ijS z xβ γ ε= + +         (6) 
and iz  is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of exposition, we 
assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target country specific tax 
rate. A standard multinomial model assumes that the errors in (6) are iid Gumbel, which 
gives the property of IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives). We relax the IIA property 
by allowing the parameter γ  to be randomly distributed across the companies.  That is, we 
assume that every company in our sample has its own γ which is known to the company but 
unknown to the econometrician, and write this as 
 '   i i iw uγ γ σ= +  where ui~iid N(0,1)     (7)  
i.e. γi∼iidΝ ( , σ2).  wi are company specific variables that are assumed to shift the mean 
effect of γi.   This model collapses to the standard multinomial choice model when σ=0.15  
 Substituting (7) into (6) gives 
 ( ' ) ( ' ) ( )' 'ij j i i i j ij j i i j j i ijS z w u x z w x x uβ γ σ ε β γ σ ε= + + + = + + +    (8) 
The company specific error term j ix uσ  induces correlation between alternatives which is not 
present in the standard multinomial choice model, and which relaxes the IIA property. Also 
note, the new additional error term is now heteroskedastic due to the presence of jx . Under 
the assumption that ijε  is iid Gumbel, the conditional probability (conditioned on γi) that 
alternative j will be chosen will be of the form of the multinomial logit probability,  
                                               
15  It is customary to call the fixed coefficient logit model, a multinomial logit model when all the variables are 
choice invariant and a conditional logit model when all the variables are choice specific.  However, there is 
no reason why one cannot have both types of variables in the model as we have. For ease of exposition, we 
describe the model as a multinomial model when the coefficients are not random. 
' iwγ
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where ijy  is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if company i chooses alternative 
j.16  The new composite error term ij j i ijv x uσ ε= + will be a mixture of normal and Gumbel 
distributions. Since γi is not known, we have to integrate out the u from the conditional 
choice probabilities to obtain the unconditional choice probabilities,  
 1
exp{ ( ' ) }
Pr (  is chosen) ( )
exp{ ( ' ) }
'
j i i j j i
ij L
'
l i i k j i
l
z w x x u
p ob j u du
z w x x u
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≡ =
+ +
∫
∑
  (10) 
where φ denotes the standard Normal density. The log likelihood will consist of terms like in 
(10). The model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood using the fact that (10) is a 
calculation of an expected value. We replace the integral by a sample average of the function 
constructed by drawing enough observations from ( )uφ to calculate this average.  It can be 
shown that this sample average consistently estimates the choice probabilities given by (10).  
In our simulations we use 50 Halton draws.17, 18     
 Relative to a standard multinomial logit model, because of the correlation between 
alternatives, this allows us to model (i) random variations in the response probability to 
changes in variables, (ii) unrestricted substitution patterns, and (iii) correlated unobserved 
factors (Train, 2009).  
b. Data  
The data for the analysis come from the 200519 file of ORBIS compiled by the Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD).  This commercial world-wide dataset provides firm-level accounting information 
on companies including ownership structure consisting of a full list of recorded shareholders 
in these companies. We use this to construct a chain of majority-owned subsidiaries for each 
company, down to the 10th level of dependency.  The M&A activities recorded in another 
                                               
16  Equation (8) collapses to the error components multinomial logit model when we allow for a company 
specific random intercept.  
17  Although there are different ways of drawing random numbers from a particular distribution, the Halton 
draws have been proven to be very effective (Train, 2009).  The results were very similar with 50 and 100 
draws.  
18  The model parameters are estimated in NLOGIT 4 (NLOGIT, 2007). 
19  The year 2005 refers to the period 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2006. 
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commercially available dataset ZEPHYR (BvD), were then merged with the original data 
from ORBIS to trace the changes in the firms’ ownership structure from 2005 to the end of 
2008. The final dataset contains, for each parent company, a list of location of all majority 
owned subsidiaries in each year between 2005 and 2008. This identification of all ownership 
changes due to M&A deals allows us to look at the location aspects of all the observed 
majority-owned acquisitions.   
 Our analysis is based on a cross-section sample of parent companies not defined as 
‘micro’ in European Commission (2003) in 2005.20 From this sample, we selected those 
parent companies that made at least one acquisition during the three year period 2006 to 2008 
regardless of whether they already had a presence in the new country or not.  The ultimate 
parent of the group is treated as being responsible for the expansions directly made and for 
those undertaken by its subsidiaries.   
 The final sample consists of 2,623 parent companies residing in 47 countries. We 
used ownership information from the original full set of data to identify companies in the 
same group in our sample. Based on the information in our base year of 2005, companies 
were classified as: (i) belonging to a multinational group if they were connected to at least 
one other company in a different country by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent of the 
capital; (ii) belonging to a domestic group if the company was connected to other companies 
by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent but with none of those companies located in a 
different country; or (iii) as a stand-alone company if it did not have any such ownership 
links with other companies.  
 The main dependent variable of interest in our model is the choice of a location 
country and hence if a parent acquires five subsidiaries in a single country in the same year, 
this parent is recorded as having made one location choice.  In that sense, we use the word 
‘acquisition’ to mean a location choice.  Some characteristics of the nature of expansions in 
the dataset are provided in Table 1. Multinationals and domestic groups equally dominate the 
sample of companies that are engaged in acquisitions during our sample period with only 
about 15% of stand-alone companies in the sample.  87% of the parents were observed to 
make only one expansion during our sample period, while 41% of the total observed 
expansions were to a new location where the parent did not already have a subsidiary.  
                                               
20  Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two subsequent years of 
recorded total assets greater than €2,000 and at least one employee. 
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 We define the choice set to preserve reasonable cell sizes for the statistical analysis 
and consider only those alternatives that have been chosen by at least 15 different parent 
companies. This yields us a choice set with eighteen possible countries. Since 59% of the 
observed expansions were in the same country as the parent, we also add an alternative 
‘domestic’ to the choice set. If the parent company is located in one of the 18 countries, it 
will have a reduced choice set of 17 alternatives plus the “domestic” option. 
 The distribution of the location of our parent companies is provided in Table 2. The 
UK has the largest number of companies undertaking an acquisition, with 674 companies, 
followed by the USA with 261 and France with 205. Table 3 provides the distribution of 
target locations chosen by this sample of parents. In this sample, the United States has the 
largest number of targets of cross-border acquisitions, and the United Kingdom the largest 
number of domestic acquisitions.  
c. Variables 
We use a number of variables informed by previous literature and the theoretical section to 
examine the determinants of M&A activity. We use three different measures of the 
corporation tax system in each country. The statutory tax rate is the headline corporation tax 
rate in the country, including typical local tax rates. The measure of allowances reflects the 
present value of allowances for a unit of new investment, based on a range of different assets. 
The EATR is the effective average tax rate, which broadly measures the proportion of the net 
present value of an investment taken in tax. The EATR is based on the methodology set out 
in Devereux and Griffith (2003). 
 Clearly we need to control for non-tax factors that affect acquisition location 
decisions. Informed by the literature described above, we include a number of control 
variables from various sources: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database, the GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago, (2011) and from La Porta et. al (2008). 
Details are given in Appendix 2. Table 4 presents means for each of the following variables 
for each of 18 potential target countries: 
• Statutory tax rate. 
• Present value of allowances. 
• EATR. 
• GDP: log of real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$. 
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• GDP growth. 
• Cost of business start-up, measured as a percentage of GNP.  
• Disclosure index, which measures the extent to which investors are protected through 
disclosure of ownership and financial information. This ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 
being the maximum disclosure. 
• Unemployment as a percentage of labour force. 
• Dummy variables for whether the countries of the acquirer and target are contiguous, 
share a common language, and share a common legal system.  
• The distance between the capital cities of the countries of acquirer and target. 
• The WDI measure of corruption in the target country.  
• The ration of market capitalization to GDP. 
• The average credit to private companies as a proportion of GDP. 
• The number of domestic companies.  
IV. Results 
We first present the results from our base model estimation in Table 5. In column [1] we 
begin with a standard multinomial logit (MNL) model. As discussed above, we distinguish 
between the alternatives of domestic expansion (dom expansion) from that of a cross-border 
expansion (cb expansion) and allow the effect of tax to be different across these two sets of 
alternatives. In addition, we also interact the tax variable with the binary indicator variable 
for whether the acquirer was a multinational enterprise in 2005 (mne2005). This means that 
we estimate 4 different coefficients on the tax variable. We include the 13 choice-specific 
control variables described above in all specifications. The ‘distance’ measures were only 
allowed to affect the cross-border choices.  In addition, in all specifications we include choice 
specific intercepts, and the parent country tax rate, the coefficient of which is permitted to 
vary across the choices as shown in (8). We report the coefficients of the choice-specific 
control variables, but in order to keep the presentation manageable, we do not report the 
choice-specific intercepts or coefficients on the parent country tax rate. 
Several of the control variables are strongly significant in all of the specifications in Table 
5. The size of the economy, measured by GDP, has a strong positive effect on the probability 
of acquiring a target in a given country. Also, as expected, targets are also more likely in 
countries that are contiguous with the country of the acquirer, share a common language and 
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legal system and are closer to each other. The cost of business start-ups has a negative effect 
on the probability of choosing a particular location, and in some specifications, greater 
disclosure also has a negative effect. These variables may proxy for a number of aspects of 
the regulatory framework in the choice country. The size of private credit also has a negative 
effect. This may reflect a substitution effect: companies may be more prone to being acquired 
by a foreign company in countries where the supply of credit, and so the possibility of 
internal expansion, is restricted. Conditional on these effects, unemployment has a positive 
effect, which may reflect the relative availability of workers.  
The tax variable used in the model results presented in Table 5 is the statutory tax rate in 
the target country. The coefficient on this variable is significant only for a multinational 
considering the domestic expansion choice. This is surprising, but this result is not robust to 
varying the econometric specification.  
In column [2] we instead estimate the random parameters (RP) model, in which every 
parent company in our sample has its own tax coefficient for the cross-border choice, and we 
assume them to be drawn from a normal distribution.  Allowing also for a random tax effect 
for the domestic expansion choice did not produce results different to the one where only the 
cross-border expansion choice tax effect is random. We therefore concentrate on only 
allowing the tax effects to be random for the cross-border expansions from now on. Including 
this random component has an important effect on the estimated coefficients – those 
presented in the table should be interpreted as a mean effect. The effect of tax on the 
domestic choice remains similar to the previous specifications. But now the tax rate on cross-
border acquisitions also becomes significant. Specifically, the first line, which can be 
interpreted as the effect for acquirers that were purely domestic in 2005, has a negative and 
significant effect. The positive and significant coefficient reported in the second line indicates 
that multinational companies respond less in cross-border expansion than domestic 
companies to differences between the tax rates in foreign countries. Also important is that the 
estimated standard deviation of the random parameters (RP) term is highly significant, 
indicating that this random components model should be preferred over the previous 
specifications. (This is also indicated by the higher maximised log likelihood.) Column [2] is 
therefore our preferred specification in Table 5, and we use it as a base for the extensions to 
model specification.     
Before doing so, we comment on the different effects of the tax rate for the different 
types of company, and for the different options. One obvious interpretation is as follows. For 
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purely domestic companies, their first acquisition abroad is likely to have an important 
strategic motive and to involve substantial fixed costs. In this context, marginal differences in 
statutory tax rates are unlikely to have a large effect as to whether to undertake a cross-border 
acquisition or a domestic acquisition. However, in choosing between alternative locations for 
a cross-border acquisition, tax appears to play a highly significant role for domestic 
companies, in accordance with Proposition 2. By contrast, for companies that are already 
multinational, undertaking a cross-border acquisition is likely to be less of a major strategic 
development for the company. For such companies, marginal differences in tax rates have a 
significant effect on the choice between undertaking a domestic or a cross-border acquisition, 
also in accordance with Proposition 2. Multinationals are also sensitive to differences in tax 
rates between alternative cross-border locations, though less so that domestic companies. One 
reason for this may reflect greater skill and experience in international taxation, and in 
particular, a greater opportunity to shift profit between countries in order to reduce aggregate 
tax liabilities. In line with Proposition 5, the effect of the statutory rate on the probability of 
making an acquisition in a particular country may therefore be weaker for multinational 
companies.  
We further explore the heterogeneity of responses to taxation in rest of the columns in 
Table 5. In columns [3] and [4] we investigate whether the effects of taxation differ according 
to the size of the acquirer in addition to whether it is multinational or domestic. Size may 
matter for several reasons. First, it seems plausible that a larger acquirer is more likely to be 
able to capture a larger share of the surplus generated in it that it is has a stronger bargaining 
power. This may make it more sensitive to differences in taxation. Second, larger companies 
can more easily bear fixed costs of expansion to new countries, and any fixed costs associated 
with shifting profit between countries. The first of these may make them more sensitive to 
marginal differences in taxation between countries, but the latter may make them less 
sensitive. In column [3] we identify a “large” company as one that owned at least 4 
subsidiaries in 2005. In column [4] we instead identify a “large” company as one that was 
present in at least 4 separate countries in 2005 – clearly this second measure applies only to 
multinational companies. In both cases we experimented by choosing different numbers of 
subsidiaries or locations and chose the results with the highest maximised value of the log 
likelihood.    
The results of columns [3] and [4] are mixed, perhaps reflecting these conflicting 
issues. In column [3] large multinationals appear to be more sensitive to tax differences than 
24 
 
small multinationals for the location of both domestic and cross-border expansion. This 
suggests that large multinationals may consider a wider choice of locations, where the choice 
is particularly sensitive to the host country characteristics. In column [4].measuring instead 
size by the number of countries in which the multinational is already located in 2005, the tax 
effects for domestic expansion are larger, but there is no difference to smaller multinationals 
in the tax effects of the location of cross-border expansion. In column [3] there is no 
significant difference in the response of large and small domestic acquirers. 
In column [5] we examine whether the effects of taxation depend on whether the 
acquirer is already located in the host country in 2005. Clearly, this also applies only to cross-
border acquisitions by multinational companies, which are located outside of the home 
country in 2005. It is possible that acquiring a company in a new, as opposed to existing, host 
country is more significant step for multinationals than the choice between cross-border and 
domestic. In fact, the results indicate that this distinction is not very large. Coefficients on 
both variables are positive and of a roughly similar magnitude, although the expansion into 
existing countries is marginally more significant. 
In column [6] we explore the second part of Proposition 2, which indicates that the 
effect of a foreign tax rate may be smaller when the acquirer is resident in a country that taxes 
worldwide income with a credit system, and where the host country has a lower statutory tax 
rate. We investigate this by allowing the coefficient on the host country tax variable to differ 
in such circumstances. We find a striking effect for multinational acquirers, though not for 
domestic acquirers. For the former, we find a large, positive and significant effect, which 
approximately cancels out the other effects applying to multinational companies (in the first 
two rows), indicating that in such circumstances the tax rate in the host country effectively 
has no effect on the choice of cross-border target. Given the possibilities of international tax 
arbitrage, this is a striking result, which is, however, consistent with results in other contexts. 
For example, Huizinga and Voget (2009) find that the identity of the parent following a 
cross-border merger depends on this effect (indicating that parents are less likely to be 
located in the US, for example). Voget (2011) also finds that such taxation in the country of 
the parent has a significant impact on relocation of parents.  
In column [7] we expand this line of investigation to investigate Proposition 5 in 
more detail. In particular, we examine whether there is an asymmetric effect of the host 
country tax rate, which could be due to profit shifting combined with location choice. If the 
host country tax rate is high, this may not dissuade acquirers from choosing that location if 
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they can subsequently shift taxable profit to another low-taxed location. But if the host 
country tax rate is low, then it may prove advantageous to shift profit into that country, 
creating a double reason for that choice of target. This would imply that we should find a 
larger effect for host countries with lower tax rates. We investigate this, relative to column 
[6], by allowing the coefficient to differ where the host country tax rate exceeds the home 
country tax rate. However, while the coefficient is positive for both domestic and 
multinational acquirers, as would be expected, neither term is significant, indicating no 
asymmetric effect of the host country tax rate when the home country has a territorial system 
of taxation. However, it is possible simply that such an effect is dominated in the data by the 
case of worldwide tax treatment by the home country.  
In Table 6 we explore Propositions 3, 4 and 6 which relate to capital expenditure. The 
first two consider cases where it is intended to increase, or reduce, capital expenditure in the 
target post-acquisition. The value of capital allowances should potentially play a role here: 
more generous treatment of capital expenditure is beneficial when it is intended to undertake 
more expenditure, but less beneficial when it is intended to reduce expenditure. More 
generally, previous literature (for example, Devereux and Griffith, 1998) has argued that the 
effective average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant measure of taxation for new greenfield 
investment (evidence from a meta analysis is provided by Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011). To 
the extent to which it is intended to expand the target company post-acquisition, then the 
EATR may be relevant to the choice of target.  
Column [1] reproduces column [2] from Table 5, which is the baseline used in Table 
6. Column [2] replaces the host country statutory tax rate with the host country EATR, to see 
whether the EATR is the more relevant measure. A problem here is that the two measures are 
highly correlated with each other, and so it is difficult to determine separate and individual 
effects. Including both tends to raise standard errors, with few of the coefficients remaining 
significant. Including just the EATR indicates that the EATR has a similar effect to the 
statutory rate. The most notable difference is that domestic expansion by non-multinational 
companies does depends significantly on the EATR. This is consistent with cross-border 
acquisition being seen as an alternative to domestic greenfield expansion through additional 
capital expenditure, especially for domestic companies. 
Column [3] instead adds a variable measuring the generosity of capital allowances in 
the host country, allowing the coefficient to vary according to whether the acquisition is 
domestic or cross-border and whether the acquirer is a multinational or domestic company. 
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Again, the results for the tax rates are very similar. According to column [3], allowances do 
play a significant and positive role for domestic acquisitions. This is consistent with the result 
for the EATR in column [2], since the EATR is in effect a non-linear combination of the 
measure of allowances used in column [3] and the statutory rate. Consistent with column [2], 
the more generously domestic capital expenditure is treated by the tax system, the less likely 
is the company to choose a cross-border acquisition.    
Table 7 returns to the issue of the nature of the sample. The results presented so far 
relate only to acquirers that undertake exactly one acquisition in the period 2005-8. This 
induces a potential selection bias, since companies undertaking multiple acquisitions may be 
more or less responsive to taxation. In Table 7, as a robustness check, we therefore take the 
alternative approach of including all acquisitions in our database. However, in order to make 
this feasible, we treat each acquisition as being independent – in effect treating each of them 
as if they were being undertaken by a separate company. An acquirer that has made, say, 3 
acquisitions will therefore appear in the data 3 times. Clearly, this approach also has 
econometric problems in that we treat the error terms as being independent. However, the 
nature of the error is different from our previous approach, and we can gauge how important 
these problems are by following both approaches. 
Table 7 reproduces the specifications in Table 5, but including these multiple 
acquisitions. Across the 7 columns, the results are broadly similar to those in Table 5. The 
coefficient estimates differ to some extent, but they are never significantly different from the 
estimates in Table 5. Standard errors tend to be slightly smaller, reflecting the larger sample 
size. The effects of size are slightly different from those in Table 5, though the coefficient 
estimates are of the same sign and broadly of the same magnitude. The effects of allowing for 
a worldwide tax system in the home country are also similar, though in Table 7 the additional 
variable is insignificant. Given that we are not allowing for correlation in the error terms 
between multiple acquisitions by the same company, the precise significance of these results 
is questionable. We include them rather to provide a check on the results in Table 6, and from 
that perspective, they provide a reasonable confirmation of those results. 
Finally, we consider the magnitude of the effects of taxes that we find on the location 
of acquisitions. Tables 8 and 9 summarise elasticities based on Table 5 column [1] and 
column [2]. In each case, the diagonal shows the own-elasticity: the effects of a 1 percent 
change in the host country tax rate on probability that an acquirer will choose a target in that 
country. The off-diagonals show the cross-elasticities: the ijth element shows the effect on the 
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probability that an acquirer would choose j of a change in the tax rate in i. By construction, 
for the standard multinational logit model (Table 8), the off-diagonal elasticities are the same 
for each row by assumption; that is, a change in the tax rate in, say, Austria, has the same 
effect on the probability of choosing any other country. This assumption is relaxed in Table 
9.  
In both tables, the own-elasticities are generally quite large, and approximately half of 
them exceed 1. For a typical country in our dataset, with a tax rate of around 30%, a 
reduction to 27%, for example, would increase the probability that an acquirer chose that 
country by more than 10%. Not surprisingly, the cross-elasticities are much smaller, with the 
exception of elasticities for the domestic tax rate, a change in which has relatively large 
effects on the probability of choosing each other country. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of estimated effects of taxation across acquirers, again 
based on Table 5, column [2]. This takes into account the heterogeneity of effects across 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and between domestic and multinational companies, 
and also the random component of the model. There is clearly a wide dispersion of effects of 
taxation on location choice. The single largest peak is at a coefficient of around -0.13, with a 
smaller peak at around -0.03. The mean (S.D.) estimated tax coefficient is -10.48 (4.98). The 
estimated coefficient varies from -17.30 to +5.28 with about 45 parents having an estimated 
positive tax effect.    
V. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of corporation taxes on the location of mergers and 
acquisitions. It contains four novel contributions. First, we are able to identify the acquirer as 
the parent company of a multinational company by combining two datasets, ZEPHYR and 
ORBIS, containing information on acquisitions and existing ownership patterns, respectively.  
Second, in identifying the effects of taxation on the location of target companies, we allow 
for heterogeneity in the characteristics of the acquirer. In particular, we distinguish between 
companies that, prior to the acquisition, were already multinational compared to those that 
were purely domestic. We also consider the size of the acquirer and whether it already has an 
operation in a given potential host country. Third, we pay particular attention to a variety of 
mechanisms by which corporate taxation could affect the location of the acquisition. We 
show that, in principle, a higher tax rate in a country could raise, reduce, or leave unchanged 
the probability that its corporations are the subject of a cross-border acquisition. We consider 
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aspects of the tax regime in both the target’s country and acquirer’s country. Fourth, we pay 
careful attention to the econometric structure of the problem. We estimate directly at firm 
level the choices of corporations as to where they acquire a target company, conditional on 
choosing to make an acquisition. We use a form of the mixed logit model which allows us to 
avoid making the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives inherent in a 
standard multinomial logit model.  
 The conceptual framework leads to several hypotheses about the impact of taxes, 
summarised in Section II. The host country tax rate would have a negative effect on a target 
being chosen if the acquirer believed that it could generate higher income than the existing 
owners. But if, for example, the acquirer intended to close down the operations of the target 
to improve its market share, then the main effect of the host country tax would be to reduce 
the price which the acquirer needs to pay for the target; in this case as well, a higher tax rate 
would make an acquisition more likely. Section II also considers several other cases, 
including the role of tax in the country of the acquirer. 
 The impact of taxes on the location of a target in an acquisition is therefore an 
empirical issue. To study this, we analyse individual domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
between 2006 and 2008 taken from the ZEPHYR database. We combine these data with 
information on acquiring companies in 2005, before the acquisitions took place, from the 
ORBIS database, which provides financial and ownership data. We estimate a location choice 
model in which the choice of target country depends on the characteristics of the acquirer and 
characteristics of the country of the target company.  
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on 
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. On average, elasticities are 
around 1: around half the countries have elasticities in excess of 1. However, the effects 
differ according to the characteristics of the acquirer and whether the acquisition is domestic 
or cross-border. More specifically, we find no effect of taxation on the choice for domestic 
companies as to whether to make their first cross-border acquisition. However, tax does 
affect the choice between cross-border locations for such companies. By contrast, 
multinational companies are sensitive to taxes for both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions, although they are less sensitive to differences in taxation between cross-border 
acquisitions than are domestic companies. There is some evidence that these effects are 
particularly strong for large companies.  
29 
 
We also present evidence that the host country tax rate does not play a role in the 
location decision when the acquirer’s country operates a worldwide tax system with a credit 
for foreign taxes, and where the host country tax rate is lower than the home country tax rate. 
This is consistent with acquirer’s taking account of home country taxation on future 
dividends from the newly-acquired target company. Finally, we find a significant of 
allowances and the EATR on the choice of target location for domestic companies, which is 
consistent with cross-border acquisition being seen as an alternative to domestic greenfield 
expansion through additional capital expenditure. 
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Appendix 1:  Marginal Effects and Elasticities in Multinomial and Mixed (Random 
Parameter) Logit Models 
The model specification for the latent surplus derived from a particular choice of a target 
company in country j (=1,…,J) by acquirer i is given by 
 'ij j i j ijS z xβ γ ε= + +   
       (1) 
where iz  is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of exposition, we 
assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target country specific tax 
rate. The company is assumed to make the choice which gives the largest surplus.  
Multinomial Logit Model  
Marginal Effect of a change in location j specific variable xj (the target country j’s tax rate), 
on the probability of a particular choice of a target company in the same country j is  
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Similarly, it is easy to show that the cross marginal effect with respect to another location m’s 
tax rate is 
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And the corresponding elasticity is given by  
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(6) 
Note, the elasticity in (6) does not depend on ‘j’. 
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We see from the above that a change in the tax rate at a particular target location will have an 
effect on not just the probability of choosing that location but the probability of choosing all 
other locations too.   
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) or Mixed Logit Model 
Instead of assuming that γ is fixed in (1), we now assume that every company in our sample 
has its own γ and write this as 
 γi =  where ui~iid N(0,1)      (7)  
i.e. γi∼iidΝ ( ,σ2).  This model collapses to the earlier one when σ=0. 
Substituting (7) into (1), we get 
 ( ' ) ( ' ) ( )' 'ij j i i i j ij j i i j j i ijS z w u x z w x x uβ γ σ ε β γ σ ε= + + + = + + +     (8) 
Estimation of company specific effect γi   
ui in (8) is an unobserved company specific random variable.  Then, by Bayes theorem, the 
density of ui given data  
 f(ui|data)= f(ui|the choices)=f(choices| ui) f(ui)/f(choices). 
Thus, 
 ( | ) ( )
( | )  ( | ) du =
( )i
u f choices u f u du
E u choices u f u choices
f choices
= ∫∫     (9) 
( | )f choices u  is the conditional likelihood which appears in the likelihood function prior to 
marginalisation, and ( )f choices  is the marginal likelihood which are obtained during the 
maximisation.  f(u) is the standard normal density by assumption in our model. The estimated 
( | )iE u choices  is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator. 
Marginal effects and Elasticities 
The conditional marginal effects and elasticities in this model will be given by equations (2)-
(5).  In order to obtain the unconditional marginal effects and elasticities, one has to 
marginalise this with respect to the distribution of the coefficients (i.e the random error u 
here), which again requires simulations to approximate the integral as discussed above. 
 
' i iw uγ σ+
' iwγ
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Appendix 2:  Data Description 
 
 
 
  Variable Description Source 
Tax Variables    
Statutory Tax Rate : Main statutory tax rate, including typical local taxes Centre for Business 
Taxation database 
Effective Average Tax Rate : Effective average tax rate, using the Devereux-Griffith 
(2003) method 
CBT database 
Allowance : The present value of tax allowances permitted per unit of 
investment 
CBT database 
Economic Indicators    
ln(GDP) : ln of GDP (originally measured in constant 2000 US$) WDI, 2011 
GDP growth : GDP growth (annual %) WDI, 2011 
Cost Bus. Start-up : Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) WDI, 2011 
Bus. Discl. Index : Business extent of disclosure index (0=less disclosure to 
10=more disclosure) 
WDI, 2011 
Unempl. : Total Unemployment (% of total labor force) WDI, 2011 
Distance Variables    
Contiguity : Dummy for Contiguity (=1 parent country and alternative 
location share borders) 
GeoDist Database, 
2011 
Common Language : Dummy for Common Language (=1 parent country and 
location 
have same official or primary language) 
GeoDist Database, 
2011 
Distance btw Capitals : Simple distance between capitals (measured in km) GeoDist Database, 
2011 
Common Legal Syst. : Dummy for Legal System (=1 if parent country and location 
have same Legal System) 
La Porta et al., 2008 
Institutional Variables    
Corruption Score : Average corruption score over the period 1996-2000 WDI, 2011 
Mkt Capit. To GDP : Ratio of market capitalization to GDP, av. 1999-2003 WDI, 2011 
Private Credit to GDP : Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003 WDI, 2011 
ln(No. Dom. Firms) : ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-2003 WDI, 2011 
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Table 1 - Characteristics of Observed Expansions 
The sample of 2,623 companies chosen for the analyses, made at least one acquisition between the end 
of 2005 and the end of 2008. Companies were categorized as Multinational, Domestic or Standalone 
based on the information in the base year 2005. A Parent is defined “standalone” when it does not own 
any subsidiaries; a “domestic” when it only owns subsidiaries in the same country; and a 
“multinational” when it owns at least one subsidiary recorded in a country different from its own. 
 
  Firms 
 Number % 
   
 Total  2,623  
   
 Multinational  1,106 42.2 
 Domestic  1,127 43.0 
 Standalone  390 14.9 
   
 Expanding only in one year  2,132 81.3 
 Expanding in two years  400 15.2 
 Expanding in three years  91 3.5 
   
 Expanding to a New Location  1,085 41.4 
 Expanding to a Old Location  1,538 58.6 
   
 Making only one expansion  2,282 87.0 
 Making two expansions  255 9.7 
 Making more than two expansions  86 3.3 
   
 Domestic Expansion (new location same as the Parent Country)  1,806 58.3 
 Cross-border Expansion  817 41.7 
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Table 2- Geographic distribution of parent firms 
The geographic distribution is provided for various samples in the following columns: (1) Total sample; (2) 
Multinational Parent Companies only; (3) Parents expanding in new locations only; (4) Parents making one 
expansion only. The location of the parent is the country where the company was initially incorporated and this 
information is obtained from the BvD database.    
 
Parent Country (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Australia 50 21 40 44 
Austria 19 13 8 18 
Belgium 64 44 25 54 
Brazil 15 5 6 15 
Canada 93 40 69 83 
Colombia 6 2 3 6 
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 61 28 31 52 
Estonia 1 1 1 1 
Finland 69 37 28 57 
France 205 117 71 170 
Germany 124 81 51 102 
Greece 20 6 6 19 
Hong Kong 1 1 1 0 
Hungary 2 2 2 2 
Iceland 7 5 3 6 
India 52 21 47 45 
Ireland 19 10 5 19 
Italy 77 44 31 70 
Jamaica 1 0 1 1 
Japan 19 18 6 19 
Kazakhstan 2 1 2 2 
Kuwait 2 1 2 1 
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 0 
Mexico 7 2 6 7 
Morocco 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 109 85 48 88 
New Zealand 2 0 2 2 
Norway 53 14 25 47 
Peru 2 0 1 2 
Poland 21 1 10 21 
Portugal 15 6 5 15 
Romania 2 0 2 2 
Russia 120 3 56 116 
Singapore 10 4 8 10 
Slovakia 1 0 1 1 
South Africa 16 5 8 16 
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Parent Country (1) (2) (3) (4) 
South Korea 45 9 29 45 
Spain 115 41 44 102 
Sweden 195 110 68 156 
Switzerland 52 45 23 39 
Turkey 4 3 3 4 
Ukraine 5 0 4 5 
United Kingdom 674 192 224 573 
United States 261 83 75 241 
Venezuela 1 1 0 1 
     
Total 2,623 1,106 1,085 2,282 
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Table 3 - Expansion Location choice made in observed acquisitions 
 
This table lists the countries where the parents chose to acquire during the sample period end of 2005 to end of 200: in the full sample (columns 1 and 2); among those 
making only one choice (columns 3 and 4); among the multinational companies (column 5 and 6). The information is split according to whether the acquisition was a 
domestic one or a cross-border one. The percentages are calculated for the chosen category. 
 
LOCATION OF TARGETS Full Sample 
Parents Making 
One Choice Multinationals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross-border acquisitions 
Austria 16 0.52% 7 0.44% 11 0.74% 
Belgium 40 1.29% 27 1.70% 30 2.01% 
Brazil 28 0.90% 16 1.01% 22 1.47% 
Canada 41 1.32% 14 0.88% 26 1.74% 
Switzerland 16 0.52% 6 0.38% 11 0.74% 
Denmark 18 0.58% 10 0.63% 12 0.80% 
Finland 36 1.16% 18 1.13% 28 1.87% 
France 75 2.42% 40 2.52% 57 3.81% 
Germany 115 3.71% 55 3.47% 83 5.55% 
Ireland 33 1.07% 15 0.95% 20 1.34% 
Italy 39 1.26% 17 1.07% 29 1.94% 
Netherlands 53 1.71% 31 1.95% 36 2.41% 
Norway 36 1.16% 21 1.32% 23 1.54% 
Russia 42 1.36% 26 1.64% 35 2.34% 
Spain 56 1.81% 38 2.39% 49 3.28% 
Sweden 75 2.42% 50 3.15% 52 3.48% 
United Kingdom 242 7.82% 147 9.26% 196 13.10% 
United States 329 10.63% 187 11.78% 240 16.04% 
Domestic acquisitions 1,806 58.33% 1,587 68.64% 536 35.83% 
Australia 18 0.58% 18 1.13% 4 0.27% 
Austria 8 0.26% 8 0.50% 4 0.27% 
Belgium 34 1.10% 31 1.95% 16 1.07% 
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Brazil 11 0.36% 11 0.48% 2 0.13% 
Canada 62 2.00% 53 3.34% 20 1.34% 
Colombia 6 0.19% 6 0.38% 1 0.07% 
Denmark 30 0.97% 24 1.51% 7 0.47% 
Finland 43 1.39% 37 1.60% 15 1.00% 
France 137 4.43% 123 7.75% 54 3.61% 
Germany 81 2.62% 67 4.22% 46 3.07% 
Greece 17 0.55% 17 1.07% 11 0.74% 
India 13 0.42% 13 0.56% 2 0.13% 
Ireland 7 0.23% 7 0.44% 2 0.13% 
Italy 53 1.71% 48 3.02% 27 1.80% 
Japan 7 0.23% 7 0.44%  0.00% 
Mexico 1 0.03% 1 0.04% 1 0.07% 
Netherlands 45 1.45% 34 2.14% 25 1.67% 
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Table 3 - Continued 
 
 Full Sample 
Parents Making 
One Choice Multi-nationals 
Norway 32 1.03% 27 1.70% 6 0.40% 
Peru 2 0.06% 2 0.13% 1 0.07% 
Poland 20 0.65% 20 0.87% 10 0.67% 
Portugal 9 0.29% 9 0.57% 5 0.33% 
Romania 2 0.06% 2 0.13%  0.00% 
Russia 117 3.78% 113 7.12% 2 0.13% 
Singapore 6 0.19% 6 0.26%  0.00% 
South Africa 7 0.23% 7 0.44% 5 0.33% 
South Korea 37 1.20% 37 2.33% 11 0.74% 
Spain 93 3.00% 84 5.29% 22 1.47% 
Sweden 121 3.91% 98 4.24% 55 3.68% 
Switzerland 14 0.45% 12 0.76% 10 0.67% 
Ukraine 3 0.10% 3 0.19% 1 0.07% 
United Kingdom 554 17.89% 460 28.99% 126 8.42% 
United States 216 6.98% 202 8.74% 45 3.01% 
       
Total 3,096 100.00% 2,312 100.00% 1,496 100.00% 
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Table 4 - Corporate Tax Rates and Explanatory Variables by Expansion Location Alternative 
 
The means for the variables used in the estimations are provided for the 18 countries used as a possible location choice. The tax data (columns (1)-(3)) were provided by the 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation database – this in turn has been developed from country reports of the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation 
(IBFD) and other sources; Columns (4)-(11) were taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database; Columns (12)-(14) were taken from the 
GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago, (2011) and La Porta et. al (2008). Details for each variable are given in Appendix 2.  
 
 
Alternative 
Statutory 
Tax Rate 
Effective 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Capital 
Allowance ln(GDP) 
GDP 
growth 
Cost Bus. 
Start-up 
Business 
Disclosure 
Index 
Unempl. 
Distance 
between 
the 
Capitals 
Common 
Legal 
System 
Corruption 
Score 
Ratio of 
Market 
Capitalisation 
to GDP 
ln(No. 
Dom. 
Firms) 
Private 
Credit to 
GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
                 
Austria 0.25 0.23 0.12 26.12 3.25 5.38 3.00 4.34 2625.81 0.10 1.83 0.16 2.49 1.01 
Belgium 0.34 0.28 0.20 26.31 2.37 5.44 8.00 7.60 2258.08 0.27 1.21 0.67 2.74 0.78 
Brazil 0.34 0.33 0.16 27.43 5.11 9.60 6.00 7.91 9312.17 0.29 0.01 0.38 0.89 0.35 
Canada 0.35 0.31 0.18 27.48 1.99 0.80 8.00 6.13 5829.38 0.42 2.27 1.05 4.30 0.96 
Switzerland 0.21 0.17 0.13 26.38 3.15 2.13 0.00 3.68 2474.11 0.09 2.26 2.52 3.58 1.59 
Germany 0.37 0.35 0.17 28.36 2.48 5.47 5.00 8.92 2498.51 0.06 1.85 0.54 2.30 1.16 
Denmark 0.27 0.23 0.15 25.92 1.39 0.00 7.00 3.67 2428.62 0.13 2.34 0.57 3.67 1.10 
Domestic 0.31 0.27 0.16 27.58 2.77 5.02 7.43 6.01 406.43 1.00 1.69 1.11 3.06 1.10 
Spain 0.33 0.31 0.15 27.31 2.95 15.41 5.00 9.22 3068.62 0.26 1.32 0.77 3.82 0.96 
Finland 0.26 0.22 0.14 25.71 3.92 1.03 6.00 6.97 2920.68 0.13 2.39 1.77 3.35 0.56 
France 0.34 0.29 0.20 28.04 1.79 1.08 10.00 8.13 2459.02 0.23 1.50 0.88 2.62 0.84 
Great Britain 0.29 0.26 0.15 28.20 2.12 0.77 10.00 5.28 2946.61 0.25 2.09 1.57 3.56 1.30 
Ireland 0.13 0.11 0.06 25.64 2.94 0.30 10.00 4.98 2432.84 0.44 1.81 0.67 2.88 1.02 
Italy 0.36 0.31 0.19 27.81 0.97 19.09 7.00 6.48 2952.72 0.27 0.77 0.53 1.59 0.75 
Netherlands 0.27 0.23 0.14 26.81 3.04 6.33 4.00 3.26 2297.24 0.26 2.27 1.32 2.52 1.32 
Norway 0.28 0.25 0.15 26.01 2.30 2.30 7.00 2.82 2548.05 0.14 2.11 0.40 3.69 0.93 
Russia 0.24 0.21 0.13 26.73 7.59 4.53 6.00 6.46 3487.30 0.26 -0.81 0.33 0.41 0.14 
Sweden 0.28 0.23 0.16 26.42 2.71 0.63 6.00 6.38 2813.55 0.08 2.35 1.13 3.44 0.88 
United 
States 0.40 0.35 0.20 30.09 1.68 0.73 7.00 4.92 6664.27 0.39 1.77 1.42 3.13 2.05 
  
43 
 
Table 5: Random Parameter Logit Model Estimation Results 
 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives. The choice set varies across companies. Some have 18 and some 
have 19 alternatives to choose from, depending on whether the domestic acquisition is part of the choice set or not. See data section for further details. All specifications are random 
parameter logits (RPL) except column (1) which has the results from a simple multinomial logit model.  The RPL model allows the effect of host country tax variable (τ∗) to be random across 
companies. The RPL model was maximised using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. In addition to the coefficients reported, all models allow intercepts and parent 
country statutory tax rate (τ) effects to vary with the alternatives. Sample size is 2,282 parents that made one location choice during the observation period: end of 2005 to end of 2008. 
mne2005 is a binary indicator for multi-national enterprises as defined in the base year 2005. cb expansion refers to cross-border expansions and dom refers to domestic expansions – both 
defined with respect to the country of location of the parent. Parcredit is an indicator for countries which operate a credit system. Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate 
significance:  *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ). 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable 
 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Presen
t in 4 or more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative is 
a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate 
(τ∗) &  
 
       
 cb expansion  -3.886 
(3.064) 
-12.349** 
(4.857) 
-11.283** 
(4.817) 
-11.578** 
(4.729) 
-12.448*** 
(4.796) 
-12.165*** 
(4.604) 
-12.739*** 
(4.862) 
 cb expansion & mne2005 0.598 
(1.132) 
5.078** 
(2.412) 
7.187** 
(2.950) 
4.409* 
(2.309)  
5.302** 
(2.154) 
6.028** 
(2.733) 
 cb expansion & large-mne2005   -4.054** (2.064) 
0.706 
(1.746)    
 cb expansion & large-Non-mne2005   -4.113 (2.802)     
 cb expansion & mne2005 & parcredit  & 
(τ>τ∗) 
     12.582** (5.506) 
12.160** 
(5.650) 
 cb expansion & mne2005 & (τ<τ∗)       -0.532 (3.637) 
 cb expansion &Non-mne2005 &  parcredit  
& (τ>τ∗) 
     -3.952 (7.301) 
-2.992 
(7.595) 
 cb expansion  & Non-mne2005 & (τ<τ∗)       1.496 (4.028) 
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Table 5 Continued 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Variable 
 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Presen
t in 4 or more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative is 
a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate 
(τ∗) &  
 
       
 cb expansion & New-Location & mne2005     4.616** (2.291)   
 cb expansion & Old-Location & mne2005     7.094** (2.786)   
 dom expansion -3.136 
(2.388) 
-5.780 
(3.693) 
-4.951 
(3.726) 
-5.929* 
(3.582) 
-5.696 
(3.682) 
-4.944 
(3.748) 
-5.266 
(4.311) 
 dom expansion  & mne2005 -5.470*** 
(1.221) 
-5.687*** 
(1.441) 
-2.762 
(2.236) 
-4.357*** 
(1.620) 
-5.646*** 
(1.443) 
-4.672*** 
(1.491) 
-4.512*** 
(1.534) 
 dom expansion  & mne2005 & large   -4.502** (2.085) 
-3.060* 
(1.709)    
 dom expansion  & Non-mne2005 & large   -2.268 (2.832)     
log GDP (constant 2000 US$) 0.569*** 
(0.105) 
1.045*** 
(0.257) 
1.028*** 
(0.260) 
1.034*** 
(0.254) 
1.062*** 
(0.256) 
 1.063*** 
(0.248) 
1.068*** 
(0.249) 
GDP growth -0.042 
(0.039) 
-0.066 
(0.051) 
-0.064 
(0.051) 
-0.075 
(0.050) 
-0.066 
(0.051) 
-0.066 
(0.050) 
-0.066 
(0.051) 
Cost of business start-ups as % of GNI -0.036*** 
(0.006) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.061*** 
(0.013) 
-0.061*** 
(0.014) 
Business extent of disclosure index -0.040 
(0.030) 
-0.010* 
(0.055) 
-0.102* 
(0.055) 
-0.102* 
(0.054) 
-0.100* 
(0.055) 
-0.109** 
(0.054) 
-0.107** 
(0.054) 
Unemployment as a % of labour force 0.060** 
(0.024) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.064* 
(0.037) 
0.067* 
(0.036) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.037) 
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Table 5 – Continued 
 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Presen
t in 4 or more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative is 
a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Contiguity of Host and Target Country  & cb 
expansion 
0.492*** 
(0.163) 
0.455*** 
(0.172) 
0.454*** 
(0.172) 
0.454*** 
(0.171) 
0.442** 
(0.172) 
0.436** 
(0.172) 
0.437** 
(0.174) 
Common Language & cb expansion 0.342** 
(0.170) 
0.315* 
(0.184) 
0.324* 
(0.184) 
0.334* 
(0.183) 
0.336* 
(0.184) 
0.317* 
(0.184) 
0.315* 
(0.185) 
Distance btw capitals of Host and Target 
Country & cb expansion 
-0.281*** 
(0.069) 
-0.424*** 
(0.085) 
-0.404*** 
(0.085) 
-0.412*** 
(0.056) 
-0.426*** 
(0.085) 
-0.438*** 
(0.083) 
-0.440*** 
(0.083) 
Common Legal System & cb expansion 0.798*** 
(0.123) 
0.800*** 
(0.127) 
0.802*** 
(0.127) 
0.799*** 
(0.127) 
0.794*** 
(0.127) 
0.801*** 
(0.127) 
0.801*** 
(0.127) 
Average Corruption Score, av. 1996/2000 -0.195 
(0.146) 
-0.368 
(0.251) 
-0.403 
(0.252) 
-0.285 
(0.237) 
-0.327 
(0.249) 
-0.467* 
(0.255) 
-0.469* 
(0.256) 
Ratio of market capitalization to GDP, av. 
1999/2003 
0.101 
(0.166) 
0.180 
(0.279) 
0.164 
(0.278) 
0.170 
(0.268) 
0.205 
(0.280) 
0.168 
(0.272) 
0.167 
(0.274) 
ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-2003 0.067 
(0.104) 
0.074 
(0.176) 
0.086 
(0.176) 
0.025 
(0.169) 
0.027 
(0.177) 
0.115 
(0.173) 
0.114 
(0.175) 
Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003 -1.087*** 
(0.254) 
-1.780*** 
(0.496) 
-1.754*** 
(0.497) 
-1.824*** 
(0.490) 
-1.795*** 
(0.495) 
-1.604*** 
(0.509) 
-1.603*** 
(0.511) 
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax (σ)  7.620*** 
(2.238) 
7.547*** 
(2.288) 
7.072*** 
(2.165) 
7.622*** 
(2.185) 
7.380*** 
(2.065) 
7.418*** 
(2.073) 
Maximised Log Likelihood -2608.10 -2602.28 -2597.17 -2591.18 -2599.12 -2595.08 -2579.97 
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Table 6: Extensions to Model Column [2] in Table 5  
This table presents results from some sensitivity checks where the statutory tax variable τ is replaced by the EATR (column [2]), or where a measure of allowances 
is also included (columns [3]). The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives. The choice 
set varies across companies. Some have 18 and some have 19 alternatives to choose from, depending on whether the domestic acquisition is part of the choice set or not. See 
data section for further details. All specifications are random parameter logits (RPL) where the effect of host country tax variable is allowed to be random across 
companies. The RPL model was maximised using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. In addition to the coefficients reported, all models allow 
intercepts and parent country statutory tax rate τ (columns [1] and [3]), EATR (column [2]), and allowances (column[3]) to have effects that vary over the 
alternatives. Sample size is 2,282 parents that made one location choice during the observation period: end of 2005 to end of 2008. mne2005 is a binary indicator for multi-
national enterprises as defined in the base year 2005. cb expansion refers to cross-border expansions and dom refers to domestic expansions – both defined with respect to 
the country of location of the parent. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance:  *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ).. 
Tax Variable used in the model Statutory Tax τ EATR τ + allowances 
 [1] (Table 5: [2]) [2] [3] 
Interaction of Tax & cb expansion  -12.349**  (4.857) 
 -10.672** 
 (5.344) 
 -9.454* 
 (5.156) 
Interaction of Tax & cb expansion*mne2005  
 5.078** 
 (2.412) 
 5.217** 
 (2.340) 
 5.106** 
 (2.424) 
Interaction of Allowance & cb expansion    -4.216  (3.257) 
Interaction of Allowance & cb expansion & mne2005    -2.214  (1.947) 
Interaction of Tax &  dom expansion 
 -5.780 
 (3.693) 
 -7.706** 
 (3.613) 
 -8.688** 
 (4.223) 
Interaction of Tax &  dom expansion & mne2005  -5.687***  (1.441) 
 -6.132*** 
 (1.539) 
 -6.296** 
 (3.119) 
Interaction of Allowance & dom expansion   10.225***  (2.919) 
Interaction of Allowance & dom expansion & mne2005    -2.013  (2.208) 
log GDP (constant 2000 US$)  1.045***  (0.257) 
 1.155*** 
 (0.270) 
1.432*** 
 (0.318) 
GDP growth  -0.066  (0.051) 
 -0.061 
 (0.049) 
 -0.060 
 (0.053) 
Cost of business start-ups as % of GNI  -0.060***  (0.014) 
 -0.058*** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.064*** 
 (0.015) 
Business extent of disclosure index  -0.010*  (0.055) 
 -0.117** 
 (0.055) 
 -0.151** 
 (0.061) 
Unemployment as a % of labour force  0.065*  (0.037) 
 0.067* 
 (0.035) 
 0.071* 
 (0.039) 
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Table 6 - Continued 
 
Tax Variable used in the model Statutory Tax τ EATR τ + allowances 
Variable [1] (Table 5: [2]) [2] [3] 
Contiguity of Host and Target Country & cb expansion 0.455*** 
(0.172) 
0.476*** 
(0.172) 
0.406** 
(0.182) 
Common Language  & cb expansion 0.315* 
(0.184) 
0.294 
(0.186) 
0.338* 
(0.190) 
Distance btw capitals of Host and Target Country & cb 
expansion 
-0.424*** 
(0.085) 
-0.400*** 
(0.081) 
-0.445*** 
(0.089) 
Common Legal System & cb expansion 0.800*** 
(0.127) 
0.814*** 
(0.131) 
0.803*** 
(0.134) 
Average Corruption Score, av. 1996/2000 -0.368 (0.251) 
-0.357 
(0.244) 
-0.242 
(0.274) 
Ratio of market capitalization to GDP, av. 1999/2003 0.180 (0.279) 
-0.026 
(0.269) 
-0.251 
(0.314) 
ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-2003 0.074 (0.176) 
0.168 
(0.169) 
0.222 
(0.193) 
Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003 -1.780*** (0.496) 
-1.794*** 
(0.482) 
-2.056*** 
(0.537) 
Standard Deviation of the RP (σ) for the tax effect 7.620*** (2.238) 
7.720*** 
(2.262) 
8.045*** 
(2.169) 
Maximised Log Likelihood -2602.28 -2590.81 -2571.47 
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Table 7: Table 5 Models Re-estimated Including Parent Making Multiple Acquisitions over the Period 2006-2008 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives. The choice set varies across companies. Some have 18 and some 
have 19 alternatives to choose from, depending on whether the domestic acquisition is part of the choice set or not. See data section for further details. All specifications are random parameter 
logits (RPL) except column (1) which has the results from a simple multinomial logit model.  The RPL model allows the effect of host country tax variable (τ∗) to be random across companies. 
The RPL model was maximised using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. In addition to the coefficients reported, all models allow intercepts and parent country 
statutory tax rate (τ) effects to vary with the alternatives. Sample size is 3,051 parents making multiple location choice during the observation period: end of 2005 to end of 2008. mne2005 is a 
binary indicator for multi-national enterprises as defined in the base year 2005. cb expansion refers to cross-border expansions and dom refers to domestic expansions – both defined with 
respect to the country of location of the parent. Parcredit is an indicator for countries which operate a credit system. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. The asterisks indicate 
significance:  *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ). 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Variable 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Presen
t in 4 or more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative is 
a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host 
Country 
Taxes 
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate 
(τ∗) &         
cb expansion  -0.497  (2.315) 
 -10.947** 
 (4.487) 
 -9.892** 
 (4.480) 
 -9.623** 
 (4.276) 
 -11.384*** 
 (4.380) 
 -11.007** 
 (4.488) 
 -11.214** 
 (4.561) 
cb expansion & mne2005 
 1.392 
 (0.874) 
 7.463*** 
 (2.328) 
 5.955** 
 (2.486) 
 4.532** 
 (1.964)  
 7.661*** 
 (2.250) 
 9.556*** 
 (2.747) 
cb expansion & large-mne2005    0.581  (1.577) 
 3.911*** 
 (1.383)    
cb expansion & large-Non-mne2005    -3.497*  (2.113)     
cb expansion & mne2005 & parcredit & (τ>τ∗)       8.089  (5.034) 
 5.963 
 (5.115) 
cb expansion & mne2005 & (τ<τ∗)        -6.111*  (3.382) 
cb expansion & Non-mne2005 & parcredit & 
(τ>τ∗) 
      -6.044  (6.582) 
 -3.791 
 (6.796) 
cb expansion & Non-mne2005 & (τ<τ∗)        0.193  (3.928) 
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Table 7 Continued 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Variable 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Presen
t in 4 or more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative is 
a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host 
Country 
Taxes 
Interaction of host-country statutory tax rate (τ∗) &  
 
       
 cb expansion & New-Location & mne2005      6.296***  (2.050)   
 cb expansion & Old-Location & mne2005      11.342***  (2.832)   
 dom expansion  -3.976*** 
 (2.021) 
 -7.786** 
 (3.441) 
 -7.307** 
 (3.457) 
 -7.572** 
 (3.263) 
 -7.441** 
 (3.444) 
 -7.659** 
 (3.641) 
 -4.959 
 (4.211) 
 dom expansion  & mne2005  -4.694*** 
 (0.945) 
 -4.693*** 
 (1.117) 
 -4.653*** 
 (1.735) 
 -4.505*** 
 (1.251) 
 -4.768*** 
 (1.126) 
 -4.073*** 
 (1.148) 
 -3.760*** 
 (1.172) 
 dom expansion  & mne2005 & large    -1.058  (1.522) 
 -0.737 
 (1.218)    
 dom expansion  & Non-mne2005 & large    -2.872  (2.077)     
log GDP (constant 2000 US$)  0.536*** 
 (0.092) 
 1.098*** 
 (0.242) 
 1.100*** 
 (0.247) 
 1.047*** 
 (0.230) 
 1.136*** 
 (0.238) 
 1.117*** 
 (0.244) 
 1.145*** 
 (0.241) 
GDP growth  -0.048 
 (0.033) 
 -0.063 
 (0.043) 
 -0.066 
 (0.043) 
 -0.073* 
 (0.042) 
 -0.067 
 (0.043) 
 -0.063 
 (0.043) 
 -0.064 
 (0.043) 
Cost of business start up as % of GNI  -0.029*** 
 (0.006) 
 -0.056*** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.056*** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.054*** 
 (0.012) 
 -0.056*** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.057*** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.060*** 
 (0.013) 
Business extent of disclosure index  -0.039 
 (0.025) 
 -0.110** 
 (0.051) 
 -0.110** 
 (0.051) 
 -0.108** 
 (0.049) 
 -0.112** 
 (0.051) 
 -0.114** 
 (0.052) 
 -0.115** 
 (0.051) 
Unemployment as a % of labour force  0.058*** 
 (0.022) 
 0.070** 
 (0.035) 
 0.072** 
 (0.035) 
 0.074** 
 (0.034) 
 0.072** 
 (0.036) 
 0.063* 
 (0.036) 
 0.067* 
 (0.036) 
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Table 7 - Continued 
Variable 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Basic 
Specification 
Multinomial 
Logit 
Basic 
Specification 
RP Logit 
Large≡4 or 
more 
subsidiaries 
in 2005 
Large≡Prese
nt in 4 or 
more 
locations in 
2005 
Alternative 
is a New-
location 
choice 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host 
Country 
Taxes 
Parent 
Country vs 
Host 
Country 
Taxes 
Contiguity of Host and Target Country  & cb 
expansion 
 0.438*** 
 (0.123) 
 0.378*** 
 (0.131) 
0.379*** 
 (0.131) 
 0.361*** 
 (0.131) 
 0.338*** 
 (0.131) 
 0.375*** 
 (0.131) 
 0.348*** 
 (0.132) 
Common Language & cb expansion  0.247* 
 (0.131) 
 0.250* 
 (0.141) 
 0.261* 
 (0.141) 
 0.278** 
 (0.140) 
 0.290** 
 (0.141) 
 0.251* 
 (0.141) 
 0.269* 
 (0.142) 
Distance btw capitals of Host and Target Country & 
cb expansion 
 -0.295*** 
 (0.053) 
 -0.424*** 
 (0.064) 
-0.414*** 
 (0.065) 
 -0.424*** 
 (0.065) 
 -0.440*** 
 (0.064) 
 -0.429*** 
 (0.063) 
 -0.436*** 
 (0.063) 
Common Legal System & cb expansion  0.686*** 
 (0.096) 
 0.694*** 
 (0.100) 
0.693*** 
 (0.100) 
 0.696*** 
 (0.010) 
 0.689*** 
 (0.100) 
 0.694*** 
 (0.100) 
 0.695*** 
 (0.100) 
Average Corruption Score, av. 1996/2000  -0.198 
 (0.123) 
 -0.383* 
 (0.231) 
 -0.386* 
 (0.231) 
 -0.230 
 (0.212) 
 -0.292 
 (0.230) 
 -0.444* 
 (0.239) 
 -0.438* 
 (0.238) 
Ratio of market capitalization to GDP, av. 1999/2003  -0.141 
 (0.139) 
 -0.246 
 (0.256) 
 -0.238 
 (0.254) 
 -0.195 
 (0.240) 
 -0.156 
 (0.259) 
 -0.250 
 (0.257) 
 -0.293 
 (0.258) 
ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-2003  0.100 
 (0.089) 
 0.150 
 (0.167) 
 0.142 
 (0.166) 
 0.039 
 (0.155) 
 0.015 
 (0.169) 
 0.179 
 (0.168) 
 0.136 
 (0.169) 
Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003  -0.758*** 
 (0.224) 
 -1.444*** 
 (0.455) 
 -1.460*** 
 (0.458) 
 -1.484*** 
 (0.434) 
 -1.514*** 
 (0.456) 
 -1.407*** 
 (0.500) 
 -1.449 
 (0.498) 
Standard Deviation of the RP (σ) for the tax effect   8.803***  (2.173) 
8.683*** 
 (2.224) 
 7.804*** 
 (2.008) 
 8.967*** 
 (2.076) 
 8.838*** 
 (2.203) 
 8.820*** 
 (2.098) 
Maximised Log Likelihood -4433.31 -4423.24 -4419.88 -4397.94 -4403.15 -4420.19 -4418.158 
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Table 8 - Elasticity wrt change of X in row choice on Prob[column choice] - – Table 5 Column [1] Model (no RP) 
 
 AT BE BR CA CH DE DK DOM ES FI FR GB IE IT NL NO RU SE US 
AT -0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BE 0.02 -1.27 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
BR 0.01 0.01 -1.30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CA 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -1.34 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
DK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DOM 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 -0.29 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
ES 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -1.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
FI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
FR 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -1.21 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
GB 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.78 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
IE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.33 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
NL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
NO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
RU 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.87 0.01 0.01 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.99 0.02 
US 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 -1.28 
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Table 9- Elasticity wrt change of X in row choice on Prob[column choice] - – Table 5 Column [2] Model (RP) 
(parents who made single choice) 
 
 AT BE BR CA CH DE DK DOM ES FI FR GB IE IT NL NO RU SE US 
AT -1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BE 0.01 -0.76 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
BR 0.01 0.00 -0.80 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CA 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.64 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.53 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 
DK 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
DOM 0.95 0.74 0.73 0.72 1.04 0.69 0.90 -0.31 0.79 0.93 0.76 0.95 1.24 0.71 0.91 0.88 0.98 0.90 0.69 
ES 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
FI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
FR 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.73 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
GB 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.76 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.04 
IE 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -1.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
IT 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.65 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
NL 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 -1.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
NO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -1.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 
RU 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -1.22 0.02 0.01 
SE 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 -1.04 0.01 
US 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 -0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.47 
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Figure 1 – The distribution of effects of the host country tax rate across all acquirers 
(From Table 5 Column [2]) 
 
 
 
Mean value= -10.48 
Std deviation = 4.98;  Skewness= 0.959;  Excess Kurtosis-3= -0.662. 
Minimum= -17.30;  Maximum= 5.28 
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